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Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested that it be kept regularly informed of progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan. The report provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since my previous report, dated 22 April 2008 (S/2008/267), as well as an update on the activities of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) through 14 July 2008.

II. Security situation

2. The reporting period witnessed the most severe violation of the ceasefire by the parties since the Malakal clashes in November 2005. In Abyei, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) from 14 to 20 May resulted in 89 fatalities, the displacement of more than 50,000 civilians, the destruction of most parts of Abyei town and the evacuation of United Nations and non-governmental organization civilian staff from the area.

3. On 10 May, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) launched an attack on Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city. Crossing 1,200 km from Darfur, JEM forces entered Omdurman with approximately 300 armed pickup trucks. Government forces repulsed the attack. According to the National Intelligence and Security Service, 79 members of Government security forces (police, military and the National Intelligence and Security Service), 57 civilians and 329 JEM fighters lost their lives during the fighting.

4. The reporting period also saw increased insecurity in Southern Kordofan State. Violent clashes between Misseriya tribesmen and SPLA from 24 to 26 April in Khatashna (23 km south of the contested town of Kharasana) resulted in an unknown number of casualties and the displacement of civilians. In the State capital, Kadugli, SPLA elements clashed with armed members of the Nuba and Hawazma tribes from 12 to 15 June. Hawazma elements reportedly mobilized further with logistical support from local Popular Defence Force (PDF) elements.

5. Inter-communal conflict flared in Southern Sudan in March and April. Fighting between Aguok and Apuk Dinka (Warrap State) in late March reportedly left



7 people dead and 17 injured. On 22 April, 92 people reportedly died in clashes between Dinka Luach from Warrap State and Dinka Pakam in Malueth; also in April, fighting between two Dinka Agar sections in Lakes State left 12 dead and 21 injured.

6. In May, the Government of Southern Sudan launched a programme of civilian disarmament across Southern States. In Pibor (Jonglei State), resistance to the disarmament exercise triggered violent clashes between SPLA and local civilians on 1 June. Similar resistance in Iloli and Logurony villages (Eastern Equatoria) on 5 June reportedly resulted in the deaths of 8 SPLA soldiers and 8 civilians, the displacement of approximately 1,410 persons and the burning of parts of the villages.

7. Insecurity related to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) increased in May and June. Cases of abductions and looting were reported in the areas of Kajo Keji, Yei and Maridi (Western Equatoria). On 5 June, 14 SPLA soldiers, 4 suspected LRA soldiers and around 12 civilians were killed during an LRA attack on the SPLA garrison at Nabanga. On 27 June, suspected LRA elements attacked the village of Moje, reportedly abducting 52 people.

8. Tensions remained high in the area around Abyei at the end of the reporting period. One United Nations military observer was shot in the head on 7 July during an altercation between an SAF national monitor and SPLA while visiting Agok market (30 km south of Abyei). The SAF monitor was also injured. Both casualties were evacuated to Nairobi, where the United Nations observer remains in critical condition.

III. Political developments

9. Following the 10 May attack on Omdurman by the Justice and Equality Movement, political forces in the Sudan rallied to support the Government of National Unity. On 13 May, the National Assembly convened an extraordinary session to condemn the JEM attack. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the National Umma Party (NUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) condemned the attack, calling for a political solution in Darfur and a fair trial for all those arrested in connection with the JEM attack. The SPLM/A leadership stressed that it would work with SAF to repulse any future aggression against Khartoum.

10. That expression of national solidarity was swiftly eclipsed by the clashes between SPLA and SAF that erupted in Abyei on 14 May. Representatives of both parties characterized the ensuing developments as the most serious crisis since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. However, in a significant breakthrough, after several weeks of consultations the parties reached agreement on a road map for the return of internally displaced persons and the implementation of the Abyei Protocol, which was endorsed by the presidency of the Government of National Unity on 8 June.

11. The long-awaited second SPLM National Convention was held in Juba from 15 to 21 May, marking another step in the transformation of SPLM into a political party. The 1,500 elected delegates, from all parts of the Sudan, voted to adopt the SPLM manifesto and constitution and, for the first time, elected the Movement's senior officials. All incumbents retained their existing positions: Salva Kiir

Mayardit as SPLM Chairman; Riek Machar, James Wani Igga and Malik Agar as Deputy Chairpersons; and Pagan Amum as Secretary-General.

12. The National Congress Party (NCP) continued its dialogue with northern opposition parties aimed at finding common ground on national issues. On 20 May, President Omer al-Bashir and NUP leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi signed a national accord agreement covering issues such as democratic transformation, civil liberties and Darfur. It will be presented to other political parties for discussion. Dialogue also continued between NCP and DUP.

13. On 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, requested that the Court issue an arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under the Statute of the Court. The request will now be reviewed by the Court's Pretrial Chamber.

IV. Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

Redeployment of forces

14. As at 8 July, the total redeployment of SAF troops verified by UNMIS and accepted by the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission stood at 97 per cent of the 46,403 troops initially stated as being present south of the current border line. For SPLA, verified and accepted redeployment stood at 10 per cent of 59,168 troops initially stated as being present north of the current border line.

15. The low percentage of SPLA forces redeployed, especially from Southern Kordofan, remains a source of tension. Its forces remain in areas which it claims are in the South, but which SAF contends are north of the 1 January 1956 line: Safaha, in the border region between Northern Bahr Al Ghazal and Southern Darfur; White Lake/Jaw, between Southern Kordofan and Unity State; and Quffa-Samri, between Blue Nile and Upper Nile States.

16. On 3 and 4 July, United Nations police in Kurmuk (Blue Nile State) reported movement of a reinforced fully equipped tank company and some 400 troops. UNMIS military was not immediately able to verify the forces owing to a lack of security clearance from SPLA. SPLA headquarters informed UNMIS that the tanks were SPLA materiel from Ethiopia, where they had been sent in 2005 for maintenance.

Joint Integrated Units

17. As at 8 July, UNMIS has verified 33,385 Joint Integrated Unit troops, representing 90.5 per cent of the stated strength of 36,866 and 84.2 per cent of the total authorized strength (39,639). Unit headquarters in Juba continued to cooperate with UNMIS and bilateral donors in an effort to attract support for training and equipment. Egypt, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made concrete offers of support, while UNMIS provided non-combat training to Units in field construction, medical aid and administration, at their request. Meanwhile, the rapid disintegration of the Abyei Units during the May clashes, during which the constituent elements of the Units effectively rejoined their respective armies, highlighted the still-fragile nature of the Joint Integrated Unit model.

Abyei

18. Longstanding tensions in the disputed town of Abyei erupted into full-scale fighting on 14 May, after the killing of an SAF soldier at an SPLA checkpoint on 13 May triggered an escalation by both sides. The fighting resulted in the displacement of civilians, casualties on both sides and the destruction of the town market. An emergency meeting of the area joint military committees was held in Abyei on 15 May, at which both parties committed themselves to easing tensions, with the support of UNMIS. Despite that agreement, fighting continued on 16 May.

19. At an emergency meeting of the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission on 18 May in Abyei, participants agreed that SPLA forces and the SAF 31st Brigade should be deployed out of the area and that the Joint Integrated Units should restore security. However, that agreement was not respected. Heavy fighting resumed on 20 May, during and after which major parts of Abyei town were burned and looted. While fighting between SAF and SPLA ended on 20 May, the situation remained tense, and both sides retained a heavy troop presence in the area.

20. According to the Mission's assessment, the clashes resulted in a total of 89 fatalities. In Abyei town, 4,739 huts were burned during and following the fighting, while some 2,005 remained intact. Approximately 30,000 people were displaced from Abyei town, while an additional 20,000 fled surrounding villages. Most were displaced south of the River Kiir to Agok, Twic County, Wau and Bentiu. Approximately 3,000 individuals fled north to Muglad and an additional 2,000 to the surrounding areas.

21. The United Nations immediately launched an emergency humanitarian operation to meet the needs of the displaced. In the Agok area, the affected population (roughly 26,000) received food and non-food items, health services and potable water supplies. In Twic County, the World Food Programme pre-positioned and distributed food at seven main hubs. In Muglad, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delivered assistance to the displaced, in conjunction with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society. United Nations agencies are considering the establishment of a United Nations office in Muglad to increase the delivery of assistance to the area north of Abyei.

22. The parties held a series of meetings to resolve the Abyei crisis, making use of established joint mechanisms. My Special Representative, Ashraf Qazi, continued the high-level dialogue with the political leadership of both sides and also encouraged local leaders to urge restraint. On 23 and 24 May, as head of a United Nations delegation to Abyei, Muglad and Agok, he urged the local SPLM and Misseriya leadership to engage in dialogue, ensure the return of displaced persons, and support the decisions taken at the meeting of the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Committee held on 18 May. On 25 May, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission also held an emergency session to address the crisis.

23. On 27 May, a meeting of the Ceasefire Political Commission was convened at the request of my Special Representative. The two parties agreed on the steps needed to address the situation, including an investigation by the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission into the incidents and the deployment of new Joint Integrated Units in Abyei. A delegation from the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, including Government of National Unity ministers and five ambassadors, visited the Abyei area on 28 May, with UNMIS support. The Security

Council delegation that visited the Sudan from 3 to 5 June held meetings with the political leadership in Khartoum and Juba. The final agreement between the parties reflects many of the recommendations generated during those meetings.

24. The road map agreement on Abyei, finalized on 8 June, comprises four points. First, the parties agreed to the deployment of new Joint Integrated Units and police units, the subsequent redeployment of SAF and SPLA forces out of Abyei area and freedom of movement for UNMIS within Abyei area. Secondly, the two parties agreed that the civilian population should return to the area once security arrangements are in place and that a civil administration headed by SPLM and deputized by NCP be set up within the agreed interim boundaries. Thirdly, oil revenues from Abyei area are to be shared according to the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with both parties contributing an agreed percentage to a fund for the development of the areas along the North-South border. Finally, the parties agreed to resort to arbitration to resolve the dispute over the findings of the Abyei Boundaries Commission and committed themselves to abide by and implement the decision of an international arbitration tribunal.

25. Progress has been made on the implementation of the road map. A presidential decree issued on 15 June establishes the administration within the agreed provisional geographical boundaries, gives Abyei area special status under the presidency and defines its administrative parameters and powers. As at 18 June, the deployment of Joint Integrated Units (613 SAF and SPLA troops) to Abyei has been completed, and preparations for police deployment are under way. UNMIS now enjoys freedom of movement throughout the road map area. SPLA and SAF commenced withdrawal from the Abyei area on 30 June and 4 July, respectively. The process, which is being monitored by joint monitoring teams, has been slowed down by heavy rainfall and bad road conditions. The decision of the parties to refer the dispute over the boundaries of Abyei to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague is a positive development.

26. UNMIS is actively supporting the implementation of the road map. In June, UNMIS facilitated the movement of 320 SPLA Joint Integrated Unit personnel and equipment from Juba to Abyei and provided assistance in terms of setting up camps, field engineering, medical supplies and emergency sustenance during the initial deployment. At the request of the Joint Integrated Unit command, UNMIS dispatched a 14-member military training team to mentor the Unit battalion before it assumes operational responsibility for Abyei. UNMIS is also working with the parties on options for support to a joint integrated police unit for Abyei.

27. Core United Nations civilian staff in Abyei are also providing good offices and planning for the return of an expanded United Nations presence. UNMIS provided support to ICRC in the burial of unclaimed corpses and has tasked contractors with clearing unexploded ordnance. The United Nations country team is working closely with national authorities on planning for the return of displaced persons. Ensuring that all returns are voluntary and in line with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement will be a high priority.

28. In the aftermath of the fighting in Abyei, UNMIS carried out a preliminary assessment of the situation and of its response. UNMIS noted that while it has a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat, within its capabilities, the responsibility for respecting the ceasefire lies squarely with the parties themselves. The Mission worked through the ceasefire structures to de-escalate tensions. While

the majority of the civilian population had fled the town and surrounding areas before the worst of the fighting began, UNMIS sheltered and escorted to safety more than 100 civilians who had taken refuge in the UNMIS compound and also safely relocated United Nations civilian staff and humanitarian workers. The United Nations coordinated the provision of emergency assistance to those displaced by the fighting. A number of lessons learned were identified that will inform the Mission's future crisis response and force posture. A review of force levels in Abyei will form part of the forthcoming UNMIS military capabilities study.

National census and elections

29. Enumeration for the fifth national census in the Sudan was conducted from 22 April to 6 May, with overall public support in most parts of the country. In Darfur, the census operation went ahead despite the opposition of all non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement and the Minni Minawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army. Internally displaced persons resisted enumeration in a number of camps despite attempts by the United Nations and the international community to break the impasse, and areas in Western Darfur bordering Chad and Southern Darfur remained inaccessible to enumerators owing to the prevailing insecurity. Government officials reported a coverage rate of 85 per cent in Western Darfur and 90 per cent in Northern and Southern Darfur. The National Population Council has announced that it will estimate the number of people not reached by enumerators on the basis of the 1993 census results.

30. In the Three Areas, irregularities were reported in parts of Southern Kordofan after the Deputy Governor issued a decree to boycott the census. Insecurity hampered enumeration in the disputed Kharasana area and in parts of Southern Sudan, particularly in Unity, Warrap and Lakes States. In the South, logistical and material shortages also hampered access to communities. Nevertheless, the Director of the National Bureau for Statistics claimed in a media statement made on 6 May that most States throughout the Sudan had achieved a 100 per cent completion rate, with a Sudan-wide coverage rate of 90 per cent.

31. Throughout the process, the United Nations provided extensive support in the area of logistics and transport. UNMIS assisted in the retrieval of census forms from the States. It is expected that census results will be released by the fourth quarter of 2008.

32. The electoral law, which under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was to be enacted no later than January 2006, was finally approved by the Cabinet on 27 June and forwarded to the National Assembly, which extended its session until 9 July for the specific purpose of enacting the law. The electoral law was adopted by the National Assembly on 7 July and signed into law by the President on 14 July.

33. The National Elections Commission, which will be the primary interlocutor of the Mission's Electoral Assistance Division, is to be established within one month of the enactment of the law. It will take some time for the Commission to reach full operating capacity, which could jeopardize the possibility of its carrying out voter registration in the early 2009 dry season and thus the possibility of holding elections in 2009.

34. The Political Parties Act, passed in January 2007, requires the establishment of a political parties affairs council, whose members have yet to be named. Several

other elements of the legal framework need to be brought into conformity with the Interim National Constitution. It is also notable that the referendum act (providing for the 2011 referendum on self-determination in Southern Sudan) has not been passed, more than a year after the date envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Meanwhile, UNMIS continues to receive requests from various Northern and Southern political parties for capacity-building to enable them to compete effectively in the elections.

Wealth-sharing

35. According to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, total oil exports for May 2008 amounted to \$514.51 million; the share of the Government of Southern Sudan amounted to \$207.06 million and that of the oil-producing States to \$10.5 million. Quoting a report of the Joint Technical Committee for Monitoring Net Oil Revenues, the Ministry on 4 June released figures showing that the shares and transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan and the relevant Southern States of net oil revenues for the year 2007 amounted to \$1,457 million for the Government of Southern Sudan, \$37.19 million for Unity State and \$22.31 million for Upper Nile State.

36. During the reporting period, UNMIS agreed with the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee on the requirements and technical specifications for the satellite imagery to be provided by the United Nations. The United Nations is finalizing the administrative process for the purchase of the imagery, which is expected to be delivered to the Committee within the next three months.

V. Implementation of other peace processes in the Sudan

37. Progress was made in the implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. The Government of National Unity signed contracts for the implementation of priority rehabilitation and development projects in the three Eastern States, totalling approximately one quarter of the \$100 million earmarked for 2008. The reintegration of more than 2,500 former Eastern Front Forces officers into SAF and the police force is also reportedly near completion.

38. On the Darfur political process, my Special Envoy, Jan Eliasson, and his African Union counterpart, Salim Ahmed Salim, have intensified their efforts to bring the parties together for informal consultations on security. Following two joint visits to the Sudan in April, the Special Envoys had planned to convene the parties in Switzerland in late May to discuss the security situation and the requirements for a cessation of hostilities agreement. Unfortunately, some of the rebel movements were unwilling to participate, and the consultations were postponed. The Special Envoys met with the regional and international partners in Geneva on 4 and 5 June and urged member States and international organizations to take greater responsibility in the process resolving the Darfur conflict. As the Council is aware, I have appointed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, Djibrill Yipènè Bassolé, as the new United Nations and African Union Chief Mediator for Darfur, and we look forward to his assuming his duties.

39. Regarding the peace process between the Lord's Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda, my Special Envoy, former President Joaquim Chissano, briefed the Council on 20 June 2008. Shortly thereafter, LRA leader Joseph Kony

re-established telephone communication with Mr. Chissano and the Chief Mediator, Riek Machar. Kony reaffirmed his commitment to the peace process and confirmed the reinstatement of Nyekorach Matsanga as head of the LRA delegation. He confirmed his desire for a final meeting in Ri-Kwangba, leading to his signing of the Final Peace Agreement. In a preparatory meeting held on 5 July, Chief Mediator Machar and my Special Envoy together reaffirmed that the negotiations were concluded successfully in March 2008 and that the purpose of a meeting with Mr. Kony in Ri-Kwangba should be only to clarify concerns previously raised. If such a meeting goes ahead, UNMIS will provide logistical support as required. I reiterate the strong support of the United Nations for the Chief Mediator and the parties and encourage all concerned to work earnestly for a successful conclusion of the peace process.

VI. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Good offices, conflict management and reconciliation

40. My Special Representative remained in constant dialogue with the political leadership of both Northern and Southern Sudan on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. During the reporting period, the efforts of UNMIS focused in particular on ending the violence and de-escalating the crisis in Abyei (see paras. 18 to 27). Extensive UNMIS support for the census as well as the assistance currently being provided by the Mission in the implementation of the Abyei road map have clearly signalled to the parties that UNMIS stands ready to provide concrete support in the implementation of agreements once an impasse has been broken.

41. In the South, UNMIS continued to support local peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in response to recurring inter-communal conflict. UNMIS worked closely with officials of Greater Equatoria to facilitate peace and reconciliation talks between the two major tribes, the Bari and the Mundari. The Mission also facilitated the implementation of an agreed transfer of the Wandering area from Jonglei to Upper Nile, ending a long-standing dispute between Nasser and Akobo counties. UNMIS continued to respond to requests from Southern Governors to assist in peace and reconciliation efforts by transporting peace advisers to local flashpoints.

42. In order to enhance its contribution to conflict mapping and analysis, and in line with the recommendations of the technical assessment mission noted in my previous report, UNMIS has developed an information management database identifying traditional, local and regional response mechanisms for conflict resolution. In collaboration with the United Nations country team, State authorities and local actors, UNMIS is developing a more systematic and comprehensive approach to supporting conflict management in the Sudan.

Military deployment and activities

43. As at 12 July 2008, 98.7 per cent of the authorized force strength (9,253 of a total of 9,375) was deployed in the UNMIS area of operations, including 534 military observers, 175 staff officers and 8,544 troops. The ceasefire monitoring structures chaired by UNMIS continue to function. The Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission and the area joint military committees in all six sectors met regularly to resolve disputes and monitor progress, particularly with regard to redeployment and Joint Integrated Unit development, and were active in seeking to address the Abyei crisis. UNMIS military observers and the parties' national monitors continued joint monitoring patrols, accounting for military movements and verifying forces assigned to Joint Integrated Units. However, restrictions on the Mission's freedom of movement hampered full verification, particularly in sectors IV and VI, and an UNMIS helicopter was grounded at El Obeid for a prolonged period after the Government repeatedly refused to authorize flight clearance, despite the intervention of my Special Representative.

44. In the latter part of the reporting period, while regular operations continued throughout the country, military activities focused on the crisis in Abyei. Immediately following the first clashes, UNMIS military engaged with the parties through the ceasefire mechanisms to de-escalate the situation. On 15 May, the Acting Force Commander flew to Abyei to facilitate negotiations. As the security situation deteriorated, UNMIS relocated international non-governmental organization staff to the UNMIS compound and evacuated civilian staff from the area. UNMIS also provided escorts for high-level delegations and escorted to safety more than 100 civilians who had sought refuge in the UNMIS compound. UNMIS patrols in Abyei town resumed immediately after the fighting. Following the signature of the road map, UNMIS military provided extensive support for the deployment and training of Joint Integrated Units and assisted in the burial of bodies and the clearance of unexploded ordnance. Patrols have regularly tested freedom of movement, which is now being granted in the area demarcated by the agreed interim boundaries.

Police

45. As at 12 July, the total strength of UNMIS police advisers stood at 631, including 47 women, deployed in 23 locations in the Mission area.

46. During the reporting period, UNMIS provided training to 2,153 officers of the Government of the Sudan and the Southern Sudan Police Service, including 225 women, through more than 70 courses. Specialized courses for Government of the Sudan police included courses on forensics, immigration, airport security, self-defence, explosive awareness and computing, while Southern Sudan Police Service officers were trained in the areas of airport security, gender, community policing and training of trainers. A total of 650 Southern Sudan Police Service officers underwent basic training at Juba, Wau and Malakal, while others underwent training for formed police units. Gender issues remained a high priority, with efforts to develop gender-sensitive community policing in the North and the conduct in April of the first-ever conference of women officers of the Southern Sudan Police Service.

47. The Government of Southern Sudan made progress in agreeing on plans and a budget for a three-year strategic approach to police training. However, the lack of basic infrastructure continues to be a major impediment. Challenges include the

sudden influx of large numbers of demobilized SPLA personnel into the Southern Sudan Police Service, the lack of effective command, control and communication, and low levels of literacy. In the North and transitional areas, UNMIS has to contend with movement restrictions and a strong military mindset on the part of the local police.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

48. Notable progress was made towards achieving the benchmarks for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as I stated in paragraph 33 of my previous report (see S/2008/267). Following approval of the national reintegration policy by the National Council for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination, a national multi-year project document on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was signed by the parties on 25 June 2008 in Geneva, at a conference co-chaired by the Government of Japan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Although few concrete pledges were made at the Sudan Consortium in Oslo and the Geneva conference, many donors indicated their willingness to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme politically and financially.

49. While UNMIS worked to develop the logistics and procurement capacity required to start disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in 2008, the Northern and Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions established technical coordination committees on disarmament and demobilization and, separately, on reintegration, which will now develop joint operational plans.

50. Discussions continue on implementation modalities in the Three Areas. In an important step, the two Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commissions began joint programme activities in Blue Nile State, resulting in the demobilization of 88 children formerly associated with SPLA. The children were reunited with their families as at 31 May, while family tracing for 189 remaining children is ongoing. Meanwhile, in Southern Sudan, in the context of the community security programme, UNMIS and UNDP supported community security and arms control programmes and worked closely with the Government of Southern Sudan to advocate for a comprehensive plan and to ensure effective monitoring.

51. Despite those achievements, many challenges remain. The authorities of the Sudan and UNMIS still need to finalize the joint operational plan. On 25 June, the representative of the Government of Southern Sudan noted that while political commitment to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration existed, the lack of infrastructure and capacity at the State level would make the process very difficult. Lack of development and employment opportunities also make civilian life less attractive to ex-combatants. Participants in the Geneva conference emphasized that there was a need to complement the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process with broader programmes targeting community security, small arms control, security sector reform and livelihoods. Funding for reintegration remains a key challenge.

Return and reintegration

52. With more than half a million internally displaced Sudanese having registered their intention to return home, by 12 July organized returns of internally displaced

persons had climbed to 27,933 for 2008 and to 80,720 cumulatively. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the total number of organized and assisted repatriations in 2008 had reached 59,876, for a cumulative figure of 136,832. It is estimated that spontaneous returns have surpassed 1.8 million; by mid-2008 total returns appeared to have reached more than 2.1 million.

53. The volatile security situation across the Three Areas and around Khartoum in the wake of the JEM attack on Omdurman disrupted return operations during May. Lack of access to communities of internally displaced persons around Khartoum and closure of road access southward resulted in delays, culminating in a decision to suspend further organized north-south returns until the dry season, in the last quarter of the year.

54. Additional displacement followed the clashes around Kharasana in April, placing further strain upon the limited resources available to meet new demands for return assistance by former non-indigenous residents. Meanwhile, displacements around Abyei in mid-May and the need to deploy all available logistical assets to stave off an impending humanitarian disaster there provoked delays in other ongoing south-south return operations.

Recovery and development

55. The transition from humanitarian to early recovery and development programming in Southern Sudan and the Three Areas has progressed well. As outlined in the United Nations and Partners Work Plan for 2008, 47 per cent of programming will be focused on early recovery and recovery and development, including 74.5 per cent of the funds sought for Southern Sudan. Funds received so far total \$883 million, against a requested \$2.3 billion for 2008. While the majority of those funds are for humanitarian activities, \$103 million is earmarked for recovery and development. Complementary to this, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2009-12 has been finalized.

56. To expedite funding to early recovery projects in Southern Sudan, donors, the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and the Government of Southern Sudan have finalized the structure of the Sudan Recovery Fund. The fund will complement the existing Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) structures and will facilitate the more tangible delivery of peace dividends in the South. By May 2008, donors had contributed approximately \$662 million to MDTFs (including investments) — \$247 million to the National MDTF and \$414 million to Southern Sudan. MDTF disbursements totalled \$232 million (including programme management) — \$93 million for the National MDTF and \$139 million for Southern Sudan.

57. Progress was also made towards supporting early recovery programming in Darfur, through the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund. A total of \$13 million has been pledged to the Fund, with \$2.5 million received, and three initial projects have been selected in Western, Southern and Northern Darfur. The goal of the Fund is to promote community-level trust, confidence and peacebuilding throughout Darfur by complementing ongoing bilateral and multilateral funding.

58. The third Sudan Donor Consortium was held in Oslo from 5 to 7 May, with 45 countries and international organizations participating at the ministerial level. The Consortium reviewed progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement and Joint Assessment Mission commitments to date (2005-2007), and it agreed on the recovery and development priorities for the second half of the interim period (2008-2011). The Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan presented joint planning documents, with a particular focus on the provision of support to the Three Areas and national infrastructure projects.

59. The review of Joint Assessment Mission progress suggested that economic targets have been largely met, though external debt is still very high and the economy remains heavily dependent on oil. It was noted that peace and an improvement in basic service delivery have led to some broad gains against the Millennium Development Goals, but the Sudan is still not expected to make the Goals target of 2015. However, donors welcomed the Government of National Unity's five-year national strategic plan for the Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan medium-term expenditure priorities, and reaffirmed their support for the Multi-Donor Trust Fund while welcoming the establishment of the Sudan Recovery Fund for Southern Sudan. Donors pledged \$4.8 billion for the period 2008-2011, allocated roughly as follows: \$1.5 billion for Humanitarian Aid, \$1.8 billion for recovery and development and \$1.5 billion undefined.

Human rights

60. UNMIS investigated allegations of international humanitarian and human rights law violations following the Justice and Equality Movement attack on Omdurman. The reported use of child soldiers by JEM was widely condemned. Several of the targets attacked were civilian buildings, including a local government office and a bank, in violation of international humanitarian law. UNMIS also found evidence that JEM may have summarily executed several civilians during an attack on a brick factory. Allegations were difficult to verify immediately after the fighting owing to Government security restrictions.

61. The Government's response to the attack raised serious human rights concerns. Hundreds of civilians were arrested in the Khartoum area and other parts of the Sudan. It appears that many were arrested because of their actual or perceived Darfurian origin and held by security forces at undisclosed locations. UNMIS received reports of torture or ill-treatment from some released detainees; the whereabouts of some reported detainees remain unknown. UNMIS has not been granted access to the detainees and is therefore not in a position to verify such claims.

62. The conflict in Abyei raised concerns in regards to allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law against civilians by armed actors. In addition, the imposition of restrictions on the media continued to constitute a limitation of the rights to freedom of the press, expression and information.

63. Delays in the adoption of enabling legislation for the National and Southern Sudan Human Rights Commissions continued to hamper the protection and promotion of human rights as envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Nonetheless, on 12 June, the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission issued its first annual report to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, denouncing reported practices of ill-treatment and torture, arbitrary arrests and detention. UNMIS continued to provide technical assistance and support to Sudanese officials, both in the North and South, as well as to community-based organizations and civil society. Training topics included the rights of children and women, human rights and law

enforcement, monitoring and reporting, and the harmonization of laws relating to sexual and gender-based violence.

Electoral assistance

64. UNMIS continued to build its electoral capacity at its headquarters in Khartoum and at the regional office in Juba. Several additional key core technical staff arrived in both Khartoum and Juba, while United Nations Volunteers worked with the United Nations Office for Project Services to conduct an infrastructure assessment in the 10 Southern States at the request of the Government of Southern Sudan. UNMIS staff met regularly with international partners in both Khartoum and Juba on planning for electoral assistance. UNMIS may need to rapidly scale up the size of its electoral support staff beyond the levels currently provided for in the 2008/09 budget once the extent of the required support is clear.

Rule of law

65. UNMIS continues to monitor developments regarding the rule of law and to provide advice on the legal reform process and to the Advisory Council for Human Rights. UNMIS began implementation of the memorandum of understanding signed with the Prisons Directorate of Khartoum in 2007 with the assessment of six prisons in the North. In Southern Sudan, UNMIS, in coordination with UNDP, continued to provide support to the Southern institutions, focusing on customary law and activities in the States in order to improve institutional efficiency and ensure their compliance with human rights standards. UNMIS continues to address issues related to the accountability of the armed forces.

66. An incident at Rumbek prison on 25 March, which resulted in one prisoner being killed and four others wounded, underlined the need for close attention and support to the Southern Sudan corrections system. UNMIS continues to provide advisory, mentoring and training support through its network of co-located corrections officers in Southern Sudan. During the reporting period, UNMIS provided 295 ex-combatants, including 50 women, with basic prison officer training in coordination with local authorities, and contributed to specialist management training for a total of 209 staff, including 21 women.

Protection of civilians

67. Following the clashes in Abyei, UNMIS worked with partners to address the protection needs of some 50,000 displaced civilians and to try to identify more than 200 missing children. Clashes between tribal communities continued to cause civilian deaths and displacement in Jonglei, Unity, Lakes and Warrap States. During April and May alone, as many as 200 people were killed in cattle raids in Lakes and Warrap States. Attacks and abductions, particularly of children, continued in Jonglei.

68. Protection of children in contact with the law in Southern Sudan remains of serious concern. UNMIS provided technical assistance to build the capacity of Government counterparts and partners. UNMIS released a report highlighting violations of the rights of child victims of abuse and child offenders, supporting broader advocacy to adopt the Child Bill (2007), create juvenile courts and increase gender and child protection desks in police stations. Monitoring and reporting of grave violations under resolution 1612 (2005) is ongoing through task forces

operating in Khartoum and Southern Sudan. A new United Nations-Government forum was established in Khartoum to follow up on my recommendations relating to children and armed conflict.

Public information

69. The Mission's public information efforts at the national level faced continued challenges. UNMIS radio (Miraya FM) still faces operational restrictions in Northern Sudan and the Three Areas. However, in Southern Sudan, it broadcasts on 13 FM relay stations and can be heard on short-wave radio. Provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement aimed at promoting media reform have yet to be implemented by the parties in advance of the elections.

70. During the national census operation, UNMIS produced a series of public-service announcements and special programmes on Radio Miraya to help raise awareness of the census process and clarify some of the attendant confusion when the starting date was delayed. The Mission has continued to promote factual and accurate reporting by national and international media through briefings, statements and interviews, in particular with regard to the recent clashes in Abyei.

Mine action

71. UNMIS mine-action teams made significant progress during the final months of the dry season, with the majority of priority roads completed and 27,023 km of roads now opened. Of the 3,387 dangerous areas identified to date, 1,685 have been cleared. UNMIS and the United Nations Children's Fund have provided mine-risk education to more than 2 million people living in or due to return to affected areas. UNMIS has also provided briefings on landmine safety to more than 13,400 UNMIS, United Nations agency and non-governmental organization staff. Following the conflict in Abyei, UNMIS undertook exceptional activities to clear landmines and unexploded ordnance in Abyei. Mine-risk education was also provided to displaced persons in the Abyei area, ahead of planned returns.

72. With the active participation of the National Mine Action Centre and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission, two transition workshops were held, in February and May, at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Kenya to discuss the 2011 handover of responsibility for mine action to the national authorities. UNMIS supported several capacity-development courses focused on managerial skills. Meanwhile, three teams from the joint integrated demining units continued their clearance operations. Those are encouraging steps towards the development of a self-sustaining national mine-action capacity.

Conduct and discipline

73. UNMIS continued to emphasize the prevention of misconduct and of sexual exploitation and abuse. Induction briefings to incoming personnel and trainings, workshops and briefings for all categories of UNMIS personnel were conducted on a regular basis. A total of 1,031 UNMIS personnel received such prevention training. In April and May, UNMIS conducted workshops in Southern Sudan and Khartoum, an outreach campaign on sexual exploitation and abuse in Juba, and a workshop on investigation skills for security investigators. During the reporting period, the Conduct and Discipline Unit received a total of 30 new allegations and concluded 21 cases.

Gender

74. UNMIS continued to provide technical expertise on gender issues to the Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan and State authorities in the Three Areas. Gender perspectives were incorporated in capacity-building training on reconstruction and community security, for example in a workshop in Southern Kordofan, where tribal, community and religious leaders agreed to strengthen and promote the role of women in peacebuilding and reconstruction processes at the community level. UNMIS also provided technical support to women representatives attending the Oslo Consortium.

HIV/AIDS

75. UNMIS continued its programme of HIV/AIDS sensitization, training 137 additional HIV/AIDS peer educators and raising HIV/AIDS awareness for 4,724 personnel. The Mission also supported national capacity-building for internally displaced persons and refugees (1,075), regular police (208), students and young people (800), prison leaders and prison staff (225) and JIUs in mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. Through quick-impact projects, the Unit supported the training of 35 local teachers as HIV/AIDS trainers, who, in turn, sensitized more than 3,000 students to the issue.

Staff security

76. On 9 May, following an official warning about an impending attack by JEM in Northern Kordofan and possibly even Khartoum, movement restrictions were imposed on all United Nations staff in the national capital, and national staff members residing in Omdurman were advised to limit their movements. Additional security measures were also implemented in El Obeid.

77. Following the escalation of violence in Abyei in May, all international and relocatable United Nations and non-governmental organization staff were transported to the UNMIS compound for their safety. Subsequently, 225 United Nations and international non-governmental organization staff were safely relocated to Kadugli by helicopter. For security reasons, United Nations civilian staff have still not been able to return to Abyei; however, the situation remains under close review.

78. In response to increasing tensions in the Kadugli area, Southern Kordofan, United Nations security personnel imposed a curfew on staff in Kadugli on 16 June. I raised the security level in Southern Kordofan to phase 3. In April, Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan, experienced a marked increase in acts of criminality which also affected United Nations staff members. UNMIS continues to monitor the possible impacts of LRA activities on United Nations staff and facilities.

79. On 12 July, I approved the raising of the security phase in Northern Sudan, including Khartoum, from level 2 to level 3 in order to improve the capacity to react to a possible emergency following the announcement made by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. While prudent contingency planning was undertaken, staff continued to perform their functions in UNMIS with a view to sustaining all critical mandated activities.

Coordination with the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur

80. As instructed by the Security Council in its resolution 1812 (2008), UNMIS continued to develop cooperation mechanisms with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMID), including regular contacts between the heads of mission and at the working level in order to coordinate on all key issues. Under this overall umbrella, specific mechanisms now exist for policy coordination between the two missions on elections, public information and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. UNMIS and UNAMID military components also routinely exchange operational information, standard operating procedures and best practices, and there is a provision for joint decision-making on issues of common concern. UNMIS also provides security for the shared logistics hub in El Obeid. Humanitarian activities are coordinated in the framework of the United Nations country team.

81. UNMIS and UNAMID have prepared a draft memorandum of understanding setting out the modalities for the mutual provision of services and support, inter alia in the areas of security, air fleet management and aircraft utilization, joint movement control, transport, medical services, communications and technology services, and the provision of supplies.

Implementation of technical assessment mission recommendations

82. The recommendations of the February 2008 technical assessment mission were translated into specific actions, and their progressive completion is being systematically monitored by UNMIS and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. A number of recommendations have been fully addressed, including those concerning the mandate review and most tasks related to UNMIS-UNAMID cooperation. Significant progress has been made in the implementation of recommendations on policy cooperation with regional partners, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission and interested groups of member States; on a military capability study and on inter-mission (security) cooperation with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; on donor mobilization for Joint Integrated Unit support; and on the development of a conflict-management strategy for the 1 January 1956 border area. The Mission continues to closely track progress on all outstanding issues.

Financial aspects

83. The General Assembly, by its resolution 62/267, appropriated an amount of \$820.7 million for the maintenance of UNMIS for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIS beyond 30 April 2009, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2009 would be limited to the amounts approved by the Assembly.

84. As at 31 May 2008, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMIS amounted to \$187.5 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$1,759.7 million. Reimbursement of troop-contributing Governments for troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 31 May 2008 and 31 March 2008, respectively.

VII. Observations

85. The past few months have been among the most volatile and challenging months since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Both the JEM attack on Omdurman and the violent clashes between SAF and SPLA forces in Abyei are stark reminders of the fragility of peace in the Sudan and of the dire consequences that could befall the Sudan and its people if the peace process were to unravel.

86. Throughout the interim period, I have emphasized the centrality of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as the bedrock for sustainable peace in the Sudan. Unfortunately, over the past three years, the efforts of the parties and of the international community to build upon that bedrock have often been compromised by the crisis in Darfur. It is critical that the balance be redressed. Ultimately, peace in the Sudan is indivisible. Constitutionally, Darfur is part of the North, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the framework for the North-South peace process.

87. The issue of Abyei has long been among the biggest challenges to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The root cause of the problem has been the failure of the two parties to agree on an approach to implement the Abyei Protocol. In my previous reports to the Council, I have repeatedly highlighted the volatility of the situation and its implications for the implementation of the Agreement.

88. The agreement of the 8 June Abyei road map is therefore a very positive development that, if implemented in good faith, could address this long-standing impasse and act as a catalyst for progress on other outstanding issues in the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I congratulate the parties on the agreement and encourage them to make full use of the opportunity it affords through the timely and full implementation of the road map and a continuing dialogue aimed at resolving other outstanding issues. I wish to reassure the parties that my Special Representative and the United Nations stand ready to provide assistance in that regard. I welcome in particular the restoration of freedom of movement for UNMIS within the Abyei interim area, which will enable the peacekeepers to play an active role in support of future conflict prevention efforts.

89. Implementation of the Abyei road map agreement will be a critical barometer of the parties' commitment to peace in the weeks ahead. I urge both parties to complete their redeployment out of the interim Abyei area as quickly as possible. The new Joint Integrated Unit and police forces must become operational quickly and act professionally and impartially. I appeal to both parties to agree rapidly on their nomination of the new civil administration and to work together to ensure the conditions necessary for the safe and dignified return of displaced persons. The United Nations will continue to work closely with all parties to help stabilize Abyei as the bridge between North and South envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

90. While the situation in Abyei requires concentrated effort, this should not overshadow the need for progress in other areas relating to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I welcome the progress that has been made towards the achievement of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration benchmarks. I note that this programme cannot start until sufficient financial

resources have been made available for the reintegration phase, and I call upon donors to contribute generously and early in order to facilitate the launch of the programme, which is one of the cornerstones of the Agreement. The incidents in Abyei have highlighted the fragile nature of the Joint Integrated Units and the need for decisive support for their development and consolidation. I welcome the latest developments with regard to a closer engagement between UNMIS and the Joint Defence Board to facilitate the coordination of support for the Units.

91. The most critical outstanding issue after that of Abyei remains the demarcation of the 1 January 1956 boundary. The delay in this process has caused the two sides to deploy forces along border areas to attain better bargaining positions, creating a de facto border line as a consequence. Local flashpoints in those areas have the potential to escalate into confrontations larger than the recent clashes witnessed in Abyei. In this regard, I am concerned about the high degree of militarization and recently reported troop movements by both parties in the Three Areas. I urge both sides to expedite the redeployment of their forces in accordance with the security protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, urgently to begin demarcation of the 1 January 1956 boundary line and to resolve the status of any disputed areas peacefully.

92. The parties should be lauded for having implemented another key benchmark of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement: the conduct of the national census. The census results, once analysed and released, will provide an important planning tool for development and basic public services throughout the country. The recent passing of the electoral law is another important milestone. I encourage the parties to expedite the establishment of the National Electoral Commission so that meaningful assistance from the international community can be realized.

93. I note the 14 July decision of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to request an arrest warrant for President Omer Hassan al-Bashir on charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The United Nations respects the independence of the judicial process. At the same time, the United Nations will continue to pursue the mandates given it by the Security Council in respect of support for the peace process in the Sudan. I welcome the assurances of the Government of the Sudan that it will continue to cooperate with and respect its obligations towards the United Nations Mission in Sudan and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

94. In conclusion, I wish to extend my gratitude to my Special Representative, to all United Nations personnel working in the Sudan and to the Member States, including troop-contributing countries and donors, for their determined efforts to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Annex

Military and police component as at 12 July 2008

Country	Military component									
	Observers		Staff officers		Troops		Military subtotal		Civilian police	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Argentina									11	0
Australia	5	1	8	1			13	2	7	3
Bangladesh	9		26		1 515	4	1 550	4	34	1
Belgium	4						4			
Benin	7						7			
Bolivia	16						16			
Bosnia and Herzegovina									2	0
Botswana	5						5			
Brazil	18						18		3	0
Burkina Faso	1						1			
Cambodia	10		1		135		146			
Canada	20	1	3	2			23	3	7	0
China	14		8		425	10	447	10	8	0
Croatia			5				5			
Denmark	8		2				10		2	0
Ecuador	20						20			
Egypt	19		19		781	15	819	15	14	0
El Salvador	1						1		5	2
Ethiopia									15	0
Fiji	7						7		8	0
Finland			1				1		1	0
France										
Gabon	4						4			
Gambia									17	1
Germany	33		5				38		5	0
Ghana									21	2
Greece	2						2			
Guatemala	2		1				3			
Guinea	6						6			
India	19		26	1	2 576	5	2 621	6	71	7
Indonesia	6						6		8	0
Italy										
Jamaica										
Jordan	12		6				18		22	4

Country	Military component									
	Observers		Staff officers		Troops		Military subtotal		Civilian police	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Kenya	6	1		1	775	44	781	46	16	3
Kyrgyzstan	6	1					6	1		
Malawi	6						6			
Malaysia	8		2				10		6	0
Mali	7						7		1	0
Moldova	2						2			
Mongolia	2						2			
Mozambique	3						3			
Namibia	7	1					7	1	1	0
Nepal	8		6				14		53	1
Netherlands	14		2				16		14	1
New Zealand	2		2				4			
Niger										
Nigeria	10						10		45	5
Norway	14	1	3				17	1	6	0
Pakistan	13		23		1 535	7	1 571	7	21	0
Paraguay	7						7			
Peru	11						11			
Philippines	13						13		22	5
Poland	2						2			
Republic of Korea	7		1				8			
Romania	12						12			
Russian Federation	13		3		119		135		11	0
Rwanda	10		2		251	3	263	3	10	0
Samoa									11	0
Senegal										
South Africa										
Sri Lanka	6						6		13	0
Sweden	3		1				4		7	3
Thailand	10	2					10	2		
Turkey			3				3		15	0
Uganda	8	3					8	3	6	3
Ukraine	13						13		11	0
United Kingdom			3				3			
United Republic of Tanzania	12	2					12	2		
United States of America									9	1

Country	Military component									
	Observers		Staff officers		Troops		Military subtotal		Civilian police	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Uruguay									1	0
Yemen	16		1				17		8	0
Zambia	8		7		329	15	344	15	7	2
Zimbabwe	11	3					11	3	29	4
Total per gender	518	16	170	5	8 441	103	9 129	124	584	47
Total	534		175		8 544		9 253		631	

**Security Council**

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Belgium, Burkina Faso, France and South Africa: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 1739 (2007), 1765 (2007) and 1795 (2008), and the statements of its President relating to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, and resolution 1777 (2007) on the situation in Liberia,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Recalling that it endorsed the Agreement signed by President Laurent Gbagbo and Mr. Guillaume Soro in Ouagadougou on 4 March 2007 ("the Ouagadougou political Agreement" S/2007/144), and the following Supplementary Agreements, as recommended by the African Union,

Recalling that it welcomed the announcement by the Ivorian authorities of the organization on 30 November 2008 of the first round of the presidential elections (S/PRST/2008/11) and that it encouraged the Ivorian parties to redouble their efforts to meet this commitment, and the international community to bring continued support to this effect,

Expressing again its appreciation to President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso ("the Facilitator") for his continued efforts to support the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular through the Ouagadougou Political Agreement follow-up mechanisms, *commending and encouraging* the continued efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States ("ECOWAS") to promote peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, and *reiterating* its full support for them,

Stressing again the importance of the international consultative organ participating in the meetings of the evaluation and monitoring committee, as an observer, and *recalling* that it may be consulted at any time by the Facilitator,

Reiterating its strong condemnation of any attempt to destabilize the peace process by force, and *expressing its intention* to examine without delay the situation after any such attempt, on the basis of a report by the Secretary-General,

Having taken note of the report of the Secretary-General dated 10 July 2008 (S/2008/451),

Noting with concern, in spite of the sustained improvement of the overall human rights situation, the persistence of cases of human rights violations against



civilians, including numerous acts of sexual violence, *stressing* that the perpetrators must be brought to justice, and *reiterating* its firm condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d'Ivoire,

Recalling its resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict and the subsequent conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict pertaining to parties in the armed conflict of Côte d'Ivoire (S/AC.51/2008/5),

Recalling also its resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) on women, peace and security, and its resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, condemning any sexual violence and *encouraging* the Secretary-General to mainstream a gender perspective in the implementation of UNOCI's mandate,

Emphasizing the importance of the continuing support of the United Nations system and the international community for strengthening the capacity of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and of the electoral bodies to organize the electoral process,

Determining that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew the mandates of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and of the French forces which support it, as determined in resolution 1739 (2007), until 31 January 2009, in particular to support the organization in Côte d'Ivoire of free, open, fair and transparent elections;
2. *Requests* UNOCI, within its existing resources and mandate, to support the full implementation of the Ouagadougou political Agreement and its Supplementary Agreements, and in particular to contribute to bringing the security needed by the peace process and by the electoral process and to provide logistical support to the Independent Electoral Commission for the preparation and the holding of the elections;
3. *Strongly encourages* the Defense and Security Force of Côte d'Ivoire and the Forces nouvelles to jointly develop a comprehensive plan for the security of the elections, in close coordination with the Facilitator, with the technical and logistical support of UNOCI which is supported by the French forces;
4. *Encourages* the Ivorian parties to make further concrete progress, in particular in removing the remaining logistical obstacles that impede the identification of the population, the registration of voters, the disarmament and dismantling of militias, the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, the unification and restructuring of defence and security forces and the restoration of State authority throughout the country;
5. *Urges* the political parties to comply fully with the Code of Good Conduct for elections which they signed under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and in particular *urges* the Ivorian authorities to allow equitable access to public media;
6. *Calls upon* all concerned parties to ensure that the protection of women and children is addressed in the implementation of the Ouagadougou political Agreement as well as the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery phases,

including continued monitoring and reporting of the situation of women and children;

7. *Stresses the importance* of ensuring the equal protection of and respect for human rights of every Ivorian as they relate to the electoral system, and in particular of removing obstacles and challenges to women's participation and full involvement in public life;

8. *Invites* the signatories of the Ouagadougou political Agreement to take the necessary steps to protect vulnerable civilian populations, including by guaranteeing the voluntary return, reinstallation, reintegration and security of displaced persons, with the support of the United Nations system, and to fulfil in this regard their commitments in accordance with the Ouagadougou political Agreement and their obligations under international humanitarian law;

9. *Expresses* its intention to review by 31 January 2009 the mandates of UNOCI and the French forces which support it, as well as the level of troops of UNOCI, in the light of the progress achieved in the implementation of the key steps of the peace process and of the progress of the electoral process, and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide to it a report in this regard three weeks before this date, including some benchmarks for a possible phased drawdown of the troop levels of UNOCI, taking into consideration the electoral process and the situation on the ground and in particular the security conditions;

10. *Reiterates* its full support to the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Côte d'Ivoire, *recalls* that he shall certify that all stages of the electoral process provide all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections in accordance with international standards and *reaffirms* its support to the five-criteria framework elaborated by the Special Representative and referred to in document S/2008/250;

11. *Recalls* that the publication of the electoral list is a crucial step in the electoral process, *calls upon* the Independent Electoral Commission, the technical operators, the authorities of Côte d'Ivoire and the political parties to redouble their efforts in this regard and *requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to certify it explicitly;

12. *Welcomes* the financial assistance provided by donors to the Independent Electoral Commission, which made it possible to finance the electoral process;

13. *Calls upon* the donors to increase in particular their financial support to the cantonment, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants and militia and to the redeployment of State administration throughout the country;

14. *Commends* the Representative of the Secretary-General for his efforts to facilitate the reinsertion of former combatants through the launching of one thousand micro projects, and *encourages* donors to contribute to their financing;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in UNOCI with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council informed, and *urges* troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including predeployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

16. *Recalls* the importance of the provisions of the Ouagadougou political Agreement and of the Supplementary Agreements, including paragraph 8.1 of the Ouagadougou political Agreement and paragraphs 8 and 9 of Supplementary Agreement number 3, and *urges* the Ivorian political forces to rely on the mediation by the Facilitator, for any major difficulty concerning the electoral process;

17. *Commends* the Facilitator for continuing to support the process to settle the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, and *requests* UNOCI to continue to assist him and his Special Representative in Abidjan, Mr. Boureima Badini, in the conduct of the facilitation, including by helping the Facilitator, as appropriate and upon his request, to carry out his arbitration role according to the provisions of paragraph 8.1 of the Ouagadougou political Agreement and paragraphs 8 and 9 of Supplementary Agreement number 3;

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed of the situation and of the preparation of the electoral process, including the process of the establishment of the electoral list, and notably by providing to it a report in this regard no later than 15 October 2008;

19. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.
